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Abstract
We characterize the optimal sequential choice of monetary policy in economies with either nominal or indexed debt. In a model 
where nominal debt is the only source of time inconsistency, the Markov-perfect equilibrium policy implies the progressive deple-
tion of the outstanding stock of debt, until the time inconsistency disappears. There is a resulting welfare loss if debt is nominal 
rather than indexed. We also analyze the case where monetary policy is time inconsistent even when debt is indexed. In this case, 
with nominal debt, the sequential optimal policy converges to a time-consistent steady state with positive—or negative—debt, 
depending on the value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Welfare can be higher if debt is nominal rather than indexed 
and the level of debt is not too high.
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1. Introduction
Fiscal discipline has often been seen as a precondition for price stability. Such is, for example, the rationale
behind the Growth and Stability Pact in Europe. The underlying policy debate shows the concern regarding a time-
inconsistency problem associated with high levels of nominal debt that could be monetized. In this paper we analyze
the implications for the optimal sequential design of monetary policy when public debt is nominal and when it is
* Corresponding author at: European University Institute, Villa la Fonte, San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy.
E-mail address: Ramon.Marimon@EUI.eu (R. Marimon).1
indexed. We characterize the optimal sequential policy choices with both nominal and indexed debt and assess the
relative performance of the two in terms of welfare.
The model is a cash-in-advance production economy where agents start the period with predetermined money
balances, which are used for transactions during the period, as in Svensson (1985). The government’s problem is to
finance exogenous government expenditures in the least distortionary manner. In this economy, an increase in the price
level decreases the real value of outstanding money and nominal debt and therefore reduces the need for distortionary
taxation. However, this also induces a fall in present consumption because of the cash-in-advance constraint. As
shown by Nicolini (1998), who analyzes the same class of economies, the incentives to inflate, or deflate, depend on
preferences and on whether debt is nominal or real.
If debt is indexed, the decision on whether to use the inflation tax, to tax today or tomorrow, hinges on the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution. If the elasticity is one then it is equal to the implicit elasticity of the cash-in-advance
constraint and the optimal plan is time consistent. However, with nominal debt, there is a reason to monetize the
debt, and the optimal policy plan is no longer time consistent. We show that in a Markov-perfect equilibrium path
the debt is asymptotically depleted, and therefore the path for the nominal interest rate is decreasing. In this case of
unitary elasticity, the fact that debt is nominal rather than indexed introduces a dynamic distortion that lowers welfare
unambiguously.
For the general case of non unitary elasticity, the optimal policy plan is time inconsistent even with indexed debt.
Optimal taxation principles dictate whether current or future consumption should be taxed more. In particular, if
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is higher than one—that is, higher than the implicit elasticity of the cash-
in-advance constraint—it is efficient to tax more current consumption; along a sequentially optimal path, indexed
debt is depleted all the way to the first best, where it is negative and large enough in absolute value to finance all
expenditures without the need to collect distortionary taxes. If the intertemporal elasticity is, instead, lower than one,
future consumption is taxed more and debt increases asymptotically.
With nominal debt, the incentives to inflate when debt is positive can compensate the incentives to deflate when the
intertemporal elasticity is lower than one. Similarly, the incentives to deflate when debt is negative can compensate
the incentives to inflate when the intertemporal elasticity is higher than one. At the debt level where these conflicting
incentives cancel out there is a steady state. This stationary level of debt is negative for elasticity higher than one,
and positive for elasticity lower than one. For different levels of initial debt, optimal sequential paths of nominal debt
converge to this steady state.
When the elasticity is different from one, in contrast with the unitary elasticity case, nominal debt solves—in the
long-run—a time-inconsistency problem present in the indexed-debt case; in particular, if the elasticity is higher than
one, there is no need to accumulate so many assets in order to achieve the first best, as in the indexed-debt case; if the
elasticity is lower than one, debt does not increase asymptotically.
A central contribution of this paper is the welfare comparison of the two regimes, nominal or indexed debt. If
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is one, indexed debt unambiguously dominates nominal debt in terms of
welfare. In contrast, if the elasticity is non-unitary, the fact that the incentive to monetize the debt can compensate
the distortions present with indexed debt can result in nominal debt dominating indexed debt. In particular, as our
computations show—when debt is relatively low—nominal debt can be a blessing, rather than a burden, to monetary
policy.
Related work includes Calvo (1988), Obstfeld (1997), Nicolini (1998), Ellison and Rankin (2007), Martin (2006),
Persson et al. (2006), and Reis (2006). Calvo (1988) addressed the question of the relative performance of nominal
versus indexed debt, considering a reduced form model with two periods, where nominal debt creates a time inconsis-
tency. There is an ad hoc cost of taxation and an ad hoc cost of repudiation that depends on the volume of debt. The
focus of Calvo (1988) is on multiple equilibria, which result from his assumption on repudiation costs. With such a
model, it is not possible to understand how debt, either nominal or indexed, can be used as a state variable affecting
future monetary policy; how optimal equilibrium paths should evolve, or why different welfare rankings of indexed
versus nominal debts are possible.
Obstfeld (1997) and Ellison and Rankin (2007) assume that debt is real, and focus on monetary policy. They com-
pute Markov-perfect equilibria when the source of the time inconsistency of monetary policy is related to the depletion
of the real value of money balances. Obstfeld (1997) uses a model where money balances are not predetermined and
therefore must consider an ad hoc cost of a surprise inflation. Ellison and Rankin (2007) use the model in Nicolini2
(1998) with a class of preferences for which the level of real debt matters for the direction of the time inconsistency
problem.
Martin (2006) studies a version of the same model we analyze although in Martin (2006) in this paper, as well
as in Díaz-Giménez et al. (2004), the government only issues nominal debt, not indexed. He provides an analytical
characterization of the long-run behavior of Markov-perfect equilibria in the case of nominal debt, and shows that
the long-run behavior depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Our paper analyzes and contrasts both
types of debt regimes, providing a numerical comparison of Markov-perfect equilibrium outcomes, characterizing the
equilibria and comparing the indexed and nominal debt regimes in terms of welfare.
A different strand of related literature studies how optimal policies under commitment can be made time consistent
by properly managing the portfolio of government assets and liabilities. The closest paper to ours in this literature is
Persson et al. (2006).1 They use a structure similar to Nicolini (1998) and assume that the government can use both
nominal and real debt as well as that there are no restrictions on debt being positive or negative.
Although we use as benchmark economies with full commitment, our main focus is on Markov-perfect equilib-
ria. In fact, the full characterization and computation of the optimal policy in such equilibria—with debt as a state
variable—is an additional contribution of our work.2
Finally, there is a recent related literature on the characterization of the best sustainable equilibrium in similar
optimal taxation problems, which also reaches the conclusion that optimal policies should, asymptotically, eliminate
time inconsistency distortions (see, for example, Reis, 2006).
The paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, we describe the model economy and define competitive equilibria
with nominal and indexed debt. In Section 3, we characterize the optimal allocations and policies under commitment,
for the purpose of understanding the sources of time inconsistency. In Section 4, we analyze and compute the Markov-
perfect equilibria with indexed and nominal debt. Section 5 contains the main results of the paper: we compare the
different regimes in terms of welfare. Finally in Section 6, we show that considering alternative taxes does not change
the analysis, as long as taxes are set one period in advance.
2. The model economy
In this section we describe the model economy with nominal debt. We follow very closely the structure in Nicolini
(1998). The economy is a production economy with linear technology,
ct + g  nt (1)
for every t  0, where ct and g are private and public consumption, respectively and nt is labor. There is a representa-
tive household and a government. The preferences of the household are assumed to be linear in leisure and isoelastic
in consumption,
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u(ct ) − αnt
]
, (2)
where u(c) = (c)1−σ −11−σ . 0 < β < 1 is the time discount factor.
We assume that consumption in period t must be purchased using currency carried over from period t − 1 as in
Svensson (1985). This timing of transactions implies that the representative household takes initial money balances
M0 and nominal public debt holdings B0(1 + i0) as given. A price increase is costly since it reduces consumption.
The specific form of the cash-in-advance constraint faced by the representative household is:
Ptct Mt (3)
for every t  0, where Pt is the price of one unit of the date t consumption good in units of money and Mt are money
balances acquired in period t − 1 and used for consumption in period t .
1 See also Alvarez et al. (2004) and Lucas and Stokey (1983).
2 In this respect, our work is closely related to Krusell et al. (2003), who characterize the recursive equilibria that obtain in an optimal labor
taxation problem, and other more recent work on Markov-perfect equilibria.3
In each period the representative household faces the following budget constraint:
Mt+1 + Bt+1 Mt − Ptct + Bt(1 + it ) + Ptnt (4)
where Mt+1 and Bt+1 denote, respectively, money and nominal government debt that the household carries over from
period t to period t + 1, and it is the nominal interest rate on government debt held from period t − 1 to t . The
representative household faces a no-Ponzi games condition:
lim
T →∞β
T BT +1
PT
 0. (5)
In each period t  0, the government issues currency Mgt+1 and nominal debt B
g
t+1, to finance an exogenous and
constant level of public consumption g.3 Initially, we abstract from any other source of public revenues. The sequence
of government budget constraints is
M
g
t+1 + Bgt+1 Mgt + Bgt (1 + it ) + Ptg, t  0, (6)
together with the no-Ponzi games condition limT →∞ βT
B
g
T +1
PT
 0. The initial stock of currency, Mg0 , and initial debt
liabilities, Bg0 (1 + i0), are given. A government policy is, therefore, a specification of {Mgt+1,Bgt+1} for t  0.
2.1. A competitive equilibrium with nominal debt
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium for an economy with nominal debt is a government policy, {Mgt+1, Bgt+1}∞t=0,
an allocation {Mt+1,Bt+1, ct , nt }∞t=0, and a price vector, {Pt , it+1}∞t=0, such that:
(i) given Mg0 and Bg0 (1 + i0), and g, the government policy and the price vector satisfy the government budget
constraint described in expression (6) together with a no-Ponzi games condition;
(ii) when households take M0, B0(1 + i0) and the price vector as given, the allocation maximizes utility (2), subject
to the cash-in-advance constraint (3), the household budget constraint (4), and the no-Ponzi games condition (5);
and
(iii) all markets clear, that is: Mgt+1 = Mt+1, Bgt+1 = Bt+1, and g and {ct , nt }∞t=0 satisfy the economy’s resource
constraint (1), for every t  0.
Given our assumptions on the utility of consumption u, it is straightforward to show that the competitive equi-
librium allocation of this economy satisfies both the economy’s resource constraint (1) and the household’s budget
constraint (4) with equality, and that the first order conditions of the Lagrangian of the household’s problem are both
necessary and sufficient to characterize the solution to the household’s problem. The cash-in-advance constraint (3) is
binding for t  0 if uc(ct )
α
> 1. This condition is satisfied for t  1 whenever it > 0, since uc(ct )α = 1 + it for t  1. For
the first-best consumption level, where uc(ct )
α
= 1, the cash-in-advance constraint does not have to hold with equality.
The competitive equilibrium of an economy with nominal debt can be characterized by the following conditions
that must hold for every t  0:
uc(ct+1)
α
= 1 + it+1, t  0, (7)
1 + it+1 = β−1 Pt+1
Pt
, t  0, (8)
and the cash-in-advance constraint, which, if uc(ct )
α
> 1, t  0, must hold with equality4
ct = Mt
Pt
, t  0. (9)
3 We assume that government expenditures, g, are given, although our analysis can easily be extended to the case of endogenous government
expenditures.
4 Let μt be the multiplier of the cash-in-advance constraint (3). At the optimum, βt (uc(ct ) − α) = μtPt , t  0. Therefore, μt > 0 as long as
uc(ct )/α > 1.4
Furthermore, the following equilibrium conditions must also be satisfied: the government budget constraint (6), the
resource constraint (1) with equality, and the transversality condition
lim
T →∞β
T
(
MT +1 + BT +1
PT
)
= 0 (10)
implied by optimality given the no-Ponzi games condition (5).
2.2. An economy with indexed debt
An economy with indexed debt is an economy in all identical to the economy with nominal debt except far govern-
ment assets. The nominal interest rate adjusts with the price level so that Bt (1+it )
Pt
≡ bt is now predetermined for every
period t  0. The intertemporal budget constraint of the household can then be written as
Mt+1 + bt+11 + it+1 Pt+1 Mt − Ptct + btPt + Ptnt .
The first-order conditions (7)–(9) are also first order conditions of the optimal problem with indexed debt.
A competitive equilibrium for an economy with indexed debt is defined as a government policy, {Mgt+1, bgt+1}∞t=0,
an allocation {Mt+1, bt+1, ct , nt }∞t=0, and a price vector, {Pt , it+1}∞t=0, such that the conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) of
Definition 1 are satisfied when nominal liabilities are replaced by real liabilities, according to Bt (1+it )
Pt
= bt , where bt
is predetermined.
2.3. Implementability with nominal debt
When choosing its policy the government takes into account the above equilibrium conditions. These conditions
can be summarized with implementability conditions in terms of the allocations. In particular, as long as the cash-in-
advance constraint is binding, the government budget constraint (6), which is satisfied with equality, can be written as
the implementability condition
ct+1uc(ct+1)
β
α
+ βzt+1ct+1 = ct + zt ct + g, t  0 (11)
where
zt ≡ B
g
t (1 + it )
M
g
t
.
To see this, notice that the budget constraint (6) with equality can be written in real terms as
M
g
t+1
Pt
+ B
g
t+1
Pt
= M
g
t
Pt
+ B
g
t (1 + it )
Pt
+ g (12)
and, using the first order conditions of the household problem, (7), (8) and (9), as well as the cash-in-advance constraint
with equality, M
g
t
Pt
= ct , one obtains the following identities: M
g
t+1
Pt
= M
g
t+1
Pt+1
Pt+1
Pt
= ct+1β(1 + it+1) = ct+1uc(ct+1)βα ;
B
g
t (1+it )
Pt
= Bgt (1+it )
M
g
t
M
g
t
Pt
= zt ct , and B
g
t+1
Pt
= B
g
t+1(1+it+1)
M
g
t+1
M
g
t+1/Pt+1
Pt (1+it+1)/Pt+1 = βzt+1ct+1.
The intertemporal implementability condition (11) together with the terminal condition limT →∞ βT (cT +1uc ×
(cT +1)βα + βzT +1cT +1) = 0, obtained from the transversality condition (10), summarize the equilibrium conditions
if the cash-in-advance constraint is always binding. Notice that the remaining equilibrium conditions are satisfied
since equilibrium interest rates, prices, nominal liabilities and labor supplies can be derived from the competitive
equilibrium restrictions; that is {it+1}∞t=0 satisfying (7), {Pt+1}∞t=0 satisfying (8), {Mt+1}∞t=0 and P0 that satisfy (9),
{nt }∞t=0 satisfying (1), and {Bt+1}∞t=0 so that zt+1 = Bt+1(1+it+1)Mt+1 .
Using the terminal condition, the present value government budget constraint takes the form
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ct+1uc(ct+1)
β
α
− (ct + g)
)
= z0c0. (13)5
2.4. Implementability with indexed debt
With indexed debt, the government budget constraint (6) with equality can be written as the implementability
condition
ct+1uc(ct+1)
β
α
+ βbt+1 = ct + bt + g, t  0, (14)
provided the cash-in-advance constraint binds. The transversality condition (10) is written as a limit
limT →∞ βT (cT +1uc(cT +1)βα + βbT +1) = 0, which implies that the present value government budget constraint takes
the form
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ct+1uc(ct+1)
β
α
− (ct + g)
)
= b0. (15)
This condition summarizes, when debt is indexed, the competitive equilibrium restrictions on the sequence of
consumption {ct }∞t=0. The only difference between the implementability conditions with nominal and indexed debt is
in the right hand side of Eqs. (13) and (15). With nominal debt, the government can affect the real value of outstanding
debt, although this necessarily affects consumption.
Notice also that an economy with nominal debt, and initial nominal liabilities z0, where the government policy
results in a choice of c0 has the same period zero, ex-post, real liabilities as an indexed economy with initial—but,
predetermined—real liabilities b0 = z0c0. We use this correspondence in comparing economies with nominal debt
with economies with real debt.
3. Optimal policy with full commitment
In this section we compare optimal policies under full commitment when debt is indexed and when it is nominal.
This is useful because, by observing how the optimal allocations differ in the initial period from subsequent ones, we
are able to understand whether policy is time consistent, and when it is not, what is the source of the time inconsistency.
In defining a full commitment Ramsey equilibrium with indexed debt, we assume—and, ex post confirm—that the
solution of the problem satisfies u
′(ct )
α
> 1, t  0, so that the cash-in-advance constraint always binds.5
Definition 2. A full commitment Ramsey equilibrium with indexed debt is a competitive equilibrium such that {ct }
solves the following problem:
Max
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u(ct ) − α(ct + g)
] (16)
subject to the implementability condition (15):
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ct+1uc(ct+1)
β
α
− (ct + g)
)
= b0.
The other competitive equilibrium variables, which are the government policy {Mgt+1, Bgt+1}∞t=0, the allocation{Mt+1,Bt+1, nt }∞t=0, and the price vector {Pt , it+1}∞t=0, are obtained using the competitive equilibrium conditions.
The optimal solution with commitment results in a constant consumption path from period one on, ct+1 = c1,
t  0. The intertemporal condition relating the optimal consumption in the initial period to the optimal stationary
consumption in subsequent periods is
uc(c0) − α = uc(c1) − α
1 − uc(c1)
α
(1 − σ) . (17)
Clearly, when σ = 1, the two consumptions are equal and the solution is time consistent. When σ < 1, (i.e., the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution is 1/σ > 1) the government prefers to tax more current consumption than future
5 See Appendix A for a discussion of equilibria with first-best outcomes and with non-binding cash-in-advance constraints.6
consumption, and therefore c0 < c1. When σ > 1, the government prefers to delay taxation and c0 > c1. In summary,
when σ = 1, the full commitment solution is time-inconsistent due to ‘intertemporal elasticity effects’.
In the definition of a full-commitment Ramsey equilibrium, we have imposed a binding cash-in-advance constraint
in all periods. When σ  1 (i.e., uc(c1) uc(c0)), the cash-in-advance constraint binds as long as there is a need to
raise distortionary taxes. When σ < 1 (i.e., uc(c1) < uc(c0)), the cash-in-advance constraint binds as long as it is not
possible to attain the first best from period t = 1 on.6
Definition 3. A full commitment Ramsey equilibrium with nominal debt is a competitive equilibrium such that {ct }
solves the following problem:
Max
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u(ct ) − α(ct + g)
] (18)
subject to the implementability condition (13):
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
ct+1uc(ct+1)
β
α
− (ct + g)
)
= z0c0. (19)
As in economies with indexed debt, it is optimal for the government to commit to a constant path of consumption
(and nominal interest rates) from period one on, but consumption in period zero may differ. With nominal debt, the
intertemporal condition relating consumption in period zero and period one is given by
uc(c0) − α
1 + z0 =
uc(c1) − α
1 − uc(c1)
α
(1 − σ) . (20)
This condition makes explicit the additional motive for consumption in the two periods to diverge when debt
is nominal. Comparing (20) with the intertemporal condition with indexed debt (17), it can be seen that, as long
as z0 ≡ B0(1+i0)M0 > 0, c0 is relatively smaller—with respect to c1—than the corresponding c0 of the economy with
indexed debt. In other words, the incentive to monetize debt always results in relatively lower period zero consumption;
whether this results in lower consumption in the initial period with respect to future consumption depends on how this
effect interacts with the ‘intertemporal elasticity’ effect already present in the indexed economy. As in economies with
indexed debt, the government commits to a constant path of consumption (i.e. of nominal interest rates) from period
one on, but consumption in period zero may be different, due to the ‘intertemporal elasticity effect’ (as in the indexed
debt case) or to the ‘nominal effect’ of monetizing nominal debts and revaluing nominal assets.
A closer inspection of (20) also shows that for every σ there is a z¯0 resulting in a constant optimal consumption
path from period zero on, and therefore policy is time consistent. Such z¯0 is obtained by solving for c, the following
steady state implementability condition: c¯uc(c¯) βα + βz¯0c¯ = (1 + z¯0)c¯ + g. That is, substituting z¯0 = −uc(c¯)α (1 − σ),
the steady state equation reduces to c¯uc(c¯)
α
[1 − (1 − β)σ ] = c¯ + g. Therefore, as long as (1 − β)σ < 1, there is a
solution for c¯ and, correspondingly, for z¯0. Notice that z¯0 is negative, zero or positive, depending on whether σ < 1,
σ = 1 or σ > 1.7
In summary, in our economies, with full commitment, it is optimal to set the same inflation tax rate from period
one on, resulting in a stationary consumption path starting from that period. With a unitary intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (log utility), the optimal policy with indexed debt is time consistent (Nicolini, 1998). The time-consistency
is lost for those same preferences if debt is nominal, since there is an additional reason to inflate in the initial period: to
reduce the real value of outstanding nominal liabilities. Under more general preferences, there is a time inconsistency
even when debt is indexed. Nominal debt in that case exacerbates the time inconsistency problem when the elasticity
of substitution is greater than one, since it reinforces the incentive to inflate, and alleviates it when the elasticity is
lower than one. If public debt is negative, the incentive for the government is to revalue this asset, so that the ‘nominal
effect’ works in the opposite direction.
6 See Appendix A.
7 Ellison and Rankin (2007) show that this possibility of having time consistent optimal policies for specific initial real liabilities can also occur
with indexed debt for some forms of non-CRRA preferences.7
4. Markov-perfect monetary equilibria
In this section we assume that the government cannot commit to a future path of policy actions, and therefore
chooses its monetary policy sequentially. We restrict the analysis to the case where such sequential choices do not
depend on the whole history up to period t but can depend on the pay-off relevant state variables—as in Markov-perfect
equilibria—and therefore sequential optimal choices are recursively given by stationary optimal policies. In particular,
in the case with nominal debt, government policy is recursively defined by ct = C(zt ) and the corresponding state
transition zt+1 = z′(zt ). Similarly, with indexed debt, government policy is recursively defined by ct = C(bt ) and the
corresponding state transition bt+1 = b′(bt ). Agents have rational expectations and therefore their consumption plans
are consistent with government policy choices and the corresponding state transitions. Our definitions of Markov-
perfect monetary equilibria take these elements into account.
4.1. Indexed debt
Definition 4. A Markov-perfect monetary equilibrium8 with indexed debt is a value function V (b) and policy func-
tions C(b)and b′(b) such that c = C(b) and b′ = b′(b) solve
V (b) = max
c,b′
{
u(c) − α(c + g) + βV (b′)
subject to the implementability constraint
C(b′)uc
(
C(b′)
)β
α
+ βb′ = c + g + b, t  0.
In order to characterize the Markov-perfect equilibrium, notice that the first order condition for c is:
uc(c) − α = λ,
and for b′,
Vb(b
′) + λ
(
Cb(b
′)uc(C(b′))
α
(1 − σ) + 1
)
= 0,
while the envelope condition is given by
Vb(b) = −λ.
These equations imply the following intertemporal condition along an equilibrium path,
uc(c
′)
α
− 1 =
(
uc(c)
α
− 1
)[
1 + uc(C(b
′))
α
Cb(b
′)(1 − σ) . (21)
It follows that in the log case (σ = 1) the optimal policy is stationary; given any sustainable level of initial debt b0,
the level is maintained and, correspondingly, the consumption path is constant.
It is also the case that the first best, where uc(c)
α
= 1, is a steady state, independently of the value of σ . Furthermore,
at the first best, where the stationary level of debt is negative and large enough in absolute value to cover expenditures,
an increase in the level of assets does not affect consumption Cb(b′) = 0, for b′  b∗, where b∗ < 0 is the level of
assets corresponding to the first best.9
Comparing the equilibrium intertemporal condition of the economy without commitment (21) with the correspond-
ing condition of the economy with full commitment (17), we see that the ‘intertemporal elasticity effect,’ when σ = 1,
is weighted by −Cb(b′), which is the marginal decrease in consumption in response to an increase in debt, as a func-
tion of the level of debt. In the numerical computation of Markov-perfect equilibria, Cb(b′) is always negative. With
Cb(b
′) negative, the intertemporal condition (21) implies that when σ < 1 the consumption path is increasing, while
when σ > 1 the consumption path is decreasing.
8 As in economies with full commitment, we assume—and ex post verify—that the cash-in-advance constraint is always binding.
9 Technically, there is a need to consider positive transfers, meaning that there is free disposal of extra revenues by the government (see Appen-
dix A).8
(a) Indexed debt: b′(b) − b for σ = 0.6 (b) Indexed debt: C(b) for σ = 0.6
(c) Indexed debt: b′(b) − b for σ = 1.0 (d) Indexed debt: C(b) for σ = 1.0
(e) Indexed debt: b′(b) − b for σ = 1.4 (f) Indexed debt: C(b) for σ = 1.4
Fig. 1. Indexed debt for various values of σ .
We now turn to the numerical results. In Appendix B we discuss the choice of parameters and describe the compu-
tational algorithm. Fig. 1 shows the optimal debt and consumption policies, b′(b) or rather b′(b) − b, and C(b), for
σ = 0.6, σ = 1.0, and σ = 1.4, and for the corresponding relevant ranges of b. As we have already mentioned, when
σ = 1.0 the initial level of debt is maintained forever, i.e. b′(b) − b = 0.
When σ < 1 the policy function b′(b) is decreasing and b′(b) < b, except at the value of debt that supports the
first-best level of consumption where there is no distortionary taxation.10 The inflation tax is higher initially so that
10 Notice that policies show small high-frequency fluctuations due to our discrete grid algorithm. Such fluctuations do not impinge on our results.
For clarity we fit a fourth-order polynomial in Fig. 1. Also see Appendix B, which provides the values of debt supporting the first-best.9
debt may be depleted and assets accumulated, to the point where there are enough assets to finance all expenditures,
and the first best is attained.
When σ > 1, the policy function b′(b) is increasing and b′(b) > b, except at the first-best level of debt b∗ < 0.
Furthermore, b
′(b)
b
< β−1, so that debt is accumulated at a rate lower than β−1 − 1. The first best is also a steady
state when σ > 1, but it is not the asymptotic state and therefore the ‘intertemporal elasticity effect’ never disappears.
Panel (f) also shows that when σ = 1.4, Cb(b′) is very close to zero. In general, as our computations have also shown,
whenever σ is close to one, Cb(b′) is very close to zero and, correspondingly, b′(b) ≈ b. This means that convergence
to the first best when σ < 1, or the accumulation of debt when σ > 1, is very slow.
4.2. Nominal debt
As we have seen, in an economy with full commitment and nominal debt, there is a ‘nominal effect’ since the
government has an incentive to partially monetize the debt in the initial period. In an economy without commitment,
this distorting effect is present in every period and therefore is anticipated by households. As in an economy with full
commitment, the ‘nominal effect’ interacts with the possible ‘intertemporal elasticity effect’.
Definition 5. A Markov-perfect monetary equilibrium with nominal debt is a value function V (z) and policy functions
C(z) and z′(z) such that c = C(z) and z′ = z′(z) solve
V (z) = max
{c,z′}
{
u(c) − α(c + g) + βV (z′) (22)
subject to the implementability constraint
C(z′)uc
(
C(z′)
)β
α
+ βz′C(z′) = zc + c + g. (23)
To characterize the Markov-perfect monetary equilibrium, notice that the first order conditions of the problem
described above are
uc(c) − α = λ(1 + z)
and
Vz(z
′) + λ
(
Cz(z
′)uc(C(z′))
α
(1 − σ) + C(z′)[1 + εc(z′)]
)
= 0,
where εc(z) = zCz(z)C(z) is the elasticity of C(z), and the envelope condition is
Vz(z) = −λc.
This implies
uc(c
′)
α
− 1
1 + z′ =
uc(c)
α
− 1
1 + z
(
1 + εc(z′) + uc(C(z
′))Cz(z′)
αC(z′)
(1 − σ)
)
. (24)
For z′ = 0, this can be written as
uc(c
′)
α
− 1
1 + z′ =
uc(c)
α
− 1
1 + z
(
1 + εc(z′)
[
1 + uc(C(z
′))
z′α
(1 − σ)
])
. (25)
As in the case with indexed debt, there is a first-best steady state, with uc(c)
α
= 1, where government assets are
enough to finance expenditures. If z ≡ z∗ = −1 − g
(1−β)c∗ with uc(c
∗) = α, the cash-in-advance constraint holds with
equality and the solution is the first best. This is an isolated steady state.11
As we have seen in the previous section, with nominal debt there is another steady state, where z¯ = −uc(c¯)
α
(1 − σ),
and c¯ solves c¯uc(c¯)
α
[1 − (1 − β)σ ] = c¯ + g.
11 See Appendix A for a more detailed discussion of the case z−1.10
To better understand the distortions present in the economy with nominal debt without commitment, it is useful to
consider the log case, where the intertemporal condition (24) can be rewritten as
1
c
− α[
1 + (1+i)B
M
] =
1
c′ − α[
1 + (1+i′)B ′
M ′
]
[
1 + εc
(
(1 + i′)B ′
M ′
)]−1
(26)
where the elasticity εc(z′) is negative and less than one in absolute value (as our computations show).
This intertemporal equation reflects the different distortions present as a result of debt being nominal and policy
decisions being sequential. The term [1 + (1+i)B
M
] results from the discretionary incentive to reduce the real value
of nominal debt. It is present in the problem with commitment only in the initial period (Eq. (20)). The marginal
benefit of increasing current consumption is discounted by the current liabilities, (1+i)B
M
, reflecting the fact that higher
consumption in the current period implies a higher real value of outstanding nominal debt and therefore higher fu-
ture distortionary taxes. Hence, the benefits of higher consumption today for the benevolent government must be
discounted to take into account these future costs. The term [1 + εc( (1+i′)B ′M ′ )] results from the dynamic nature of this
problem and reflects the cost of the time inconsistency problem being exacerbated in the future, due to an increase in
outstanding liabilities at the end of the current period.12 For σ = 1, these two effects are compounded by the ‘intertem-
poral elasticity effects’ and, as we have seen, the interaction of all these effects may result in stationary solutions not
present in the economy with indexed debt.
In Fig. 2 we report our findings for the same three elasticity values, σ = 0.6, σ = 1.0, and σ = 1.4, when debt is
nominal. We find that in all three cases, z′(z) − z is decreasing and, as we have shown before, there is a steady state
at z¯ = 0 when σ = 1, z¯ < 0 when σ < 1, and z¯ > 0 when σ > 1.13 Since z′(z) − z is decreasing, these steady states
correspond to the asymptotic behavior of nominal debt paths.
In contrast with the indexed debt case illustrated in Fig. 1, when σ = 1 the stock of debt is no longer constant, but is
progressively depleted until the ‘nominal effect’ disappears at z¯ = 0. When σ < 1, debt is also progressively depleted
and assets are accumulated but, in contrast with the indexed-debt case, this process leads to a level of assets z¯ which
is lower than the first-best steady-state level, since −1 < z¯ < 0 and the first best would require z < −1.
When σ > 1, debt is not accumulated without bound—as was the case with indexed debt—but is accumulated or
progressively depleted until it reaches the distorted steady state z¯ > 0 in which the ‘nominal’ and the ‘intertemporal
elasticity’ effects cancel out. As in the indexed-debt case, for σ = 1.4, z′(z) − z is fairly flat and, as a result, long-run
convergence (divergence in the indexed-debt case) is very slow (see panel (e) in Fig. 2).
(a) Nominal debt: z′(z) − z for σ = 0.6 (b) Nominal debt: C(z) for σ = 0.6
Fig. 2. Nominal debt for various values of σ .
12 Myopic governments that do not take into account the effect of their choices on the state variables of future government decisions would be
solving the problem with only the first term present.
13 See Appendix B for the corresponding values of z¯.11
(c) Nominal debt: z′(z) − z for σ = 1.0 (d) Nominal debt: C(z) for σ = 1.0
(e) Nominal debt: z′(z) − z for σ = 1.4 (f) Nominal debt: C(z) for σ = 1.4
Fig. 2. (continued)
5. Welfare comparisons
In the last two sections we have seen how optimal monetary policies may result in different time paths for debt and
inflation, corresponding to different distortions, depending on whether monetary authorities can or cannot commit, and
whether debt is indexed or nominal. In this section we address the central question of how these different monetary
regimes compare in terms of welfare.
There is an immediate and unambiguous comparison between economies with and without commitment with the
same type of liabilities (i.e. either indexed or nominal debt in both economies). As one would expect, Markov-perfect
equilibria are less efficient than full-commitment Ramsey equilibria, unless the initial conditions are such that Ramsey
equilibria are stationary and, therefore, time-consistent. This result follows from the fact that the full-commitment
Ramsey solution is the choice of a sequence of consumption {ct }∞t=0 which maximizes utility (16) in the set of com-
petitive equilibrium sequences defined either by (15) with indexed debt, or by (13) with nominal debt, while the
Markov-perfect equilibrium imposes additional restrictions to this maximization problem: the optimality of future
government decisions. In other words, the Ramsey solution is the solution of a maximization problem of a committed
government in period zero, while the Markov-perfect equilibrium can be better thought of the equilibrium of a game
between successive governments, in which the optimal plan of the period-zero government has to take into account
the sequential decisions of future governments (or its own future revised policies).
It is less straightforward to compare economies with different types of liabilities. Nevertheless, we can compare
the welfare of an economy with nominal debt with an—otherwise identical—economy with indexed debt, provided
that both have the same initial (equilibrium) levels of either real or nominal liabilities.
We compare economies with the same real value of initial liabilities. In economies with full commitment, if in the
indexed-debt economy initial real liabilities are b0, then in the nominal-debt economy nominal liabilities z0 have to be
such that b0 = z0C0(z0), where C0(z0) is the full-commitment optimal choice of initial consumption in the economy12
with nominal debt.14 It is then trivial to compare the two economies in terms of welfare under full commitment.
Given that both economies have the same initial real liabilities b0, a benevolent government accounting for such real
liabilities achieves higher welfare than one which does not, i.e. welfare in the indexed debt economy is higher than in
the corresponding nominal debt economy. We state this formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Consider two economies with full commitment with an initial money stock M0. One of them has initial
nominal debt B0(1+ i0) > 0, and the other has initial indexed debt b0. Suppose b0 = B0(1+i0)P0 , where P0 is the period-
zero price in the economy with nominal debt. Then, the economy with nominal debt always gives lower welfare,
independently of the value of σ .
Proof. The nominal debt economy has initial condition z0 = B0(1+i0)M0 , while the indexed economy has initial condition
b0 = z0C0(z0), where C0(z0) is the full-commitment optimal choice of initial consumption in the economy with
nominal debt. The optimal solutions in the two economies have to satisfy the same implementability condition. Taking
into account that optimal consumption paths are constant after period zero, this implementability condition is:
βc1
[
uc(c1)
α
− 1
]
− (1 − β)c0 − g = (1 − β)b0.
Given this condition, the solution with the highest welfare is the solution with indexed debt, satisfying
uc(c0) − α = uc(c1) − α(
1 − uc(c1)
α
(1 − σ)) ,
since the solution with nominal debt is distorted by z0 (even if there is no ‘unexpected inflation’; i.e. realized real
liabilities are b0) according to
uc(c0) − α
1 + z0 =
uc(c1) − α(
1 − uc(c1)
α
(1 − σ)) .
If the solution with nominal debt is different, as when z0 = 0, then the solution with nominal debt gives strictly lower
welfare. 
The choice of comparing economies with the same real value of initial liabilities under full commitment is con-
sistent with how the Markov-perfect equilibria of the two economies without full commitment should be compared.
A Markov-perfect equilibrium, like any competitive equilibrium, imposes the ‘rational expectations’ condition that
agents have the right expectations regarding future liabilities. In particular, the indexed economy is characterized by
having nominal interest rates adjusting to price changes so as to guarantee the predetermined value of real liabilities.
With nominal debt, real liabilities are not predetermined, but with rational expectations (and no uncertainty), ex post
real returns correspond to agents’ ex ante expected values. In a Markov-perfect equilibrium, strategies are policies
that only depend on the state variable and therefore such policies do not treat period zero differently. It follows that in
a Markov-perfect equilibrium of an economy with nominal debt, the government has no ‘free lunch’ from unexpected
inflation, even in period zero.
As we have just seen, with full commitment indexed debt is unambiguously more efficient than nominal debt,
when the pure monetization effect is not considered. Without commitment, along a Markov-perfect equilibrium path,
there are no ‘free lunches’. Does this mean that indexed debt is better than nominal debt? The following proposition
provides an interesting answer to this question.
Proposition 2.
Consider two economies without commitment and initial money stock M0. One of them has initial nominal debt
B0(1 + i0) > 0, and the other has initial indexed debt b0. Suppose b0 = B0(1+i0)P0 , where P0 is the period-zero price in
the economy with nominal debt.
(i) If σ = 1, the welfare in the economy with indexed debt is higher than in the economy with nominal debt.
14 If the mapping from b0 to z0 is not unique, we select the lowest z0; however, in our computations it is unique.13
(ii) If σ = 1, the welfare in the economy with nominal debt can be higher or lower than in the economy with indexed
debt, depending on b0.
Part (i) of Proposition 2 follows from previous results. First, in the log case with indexed debt, policy is time
consistent; hence, the full-commitment and the Markov-perfect equilibria coincide. Second, from Proposition 1, the
full-commitment equilibrium with nominal debt provides lower welfare than the equilibrium with indexed debt. Third,
as we have seen, the Markov-perfect equilibrium introduces additional constraints to the full-commitment maximiza-
tion problem, resulting in lower welfare in the economy with nominal debt. Therefore, when σ = 1, indexed debt
dominates nominal debt in terms of welfare. Part (ii) of Proposition 2 follows from our numerical simulations, show-
ing that welfare reversals may occur.
Fig. 3 shows that—in spite of the roughness of our discrete choice algorithm—the value functions are very well
behaved; e.g. decreasing and concave in b, and fairly smooth. This allows for (robust) welfare comparisons, once
(a) Indexed debt: V (b) for σ = 0.6 (b) Nominal debt: V (z) for σ = 0.6
(c) Indexed debt: V (b) for σ = 1.0 (d) Nominal debt: V (z) for σ = 1.0
(e) Indexed debt: V (b) σ = 1.4 (f) Nominal debt: V (z) for σ = 1.4
Fig. 3. Value functions for indexed and nominal debt and various values of σ .14
(a) Vn(z) and Vi [b(z)] for σ = 0.6 (b) Vi [b(z)] − Vn(z) for σ = 0.6
(c) Vn(z) and Vi [b(z)] for σ = 1.0 (d) Vi [b(z)] − Vn(z) for σ = 1.0
(e) Vn(z) and Vi [b(z)] for σ = 1.4 (f) Vi [b(z)] − Vn(z) for σ = 1.4
Fig. 4. Welfare comparisons for various values of σ .
indexed and nominal debt value functions take the same domain. Fig. 4 illustrates Proposition 2. It compares the value
functions with indexed debt Vi and with nominal debt Vn as functions of nominal liabilities z; that is, Vi(b(z)), where
b(z) ≡ zC(z).
Panels (c) and (d) of Fig. 4 show the unambiguous result in part (i) of Proposition 2, that, with unitary elasticity,
indexed debt dominates nominal debt in terms of welfare. The remaining panels illustrate the result in the second
part of Proposition 2. In particular, when σ = 1, there is a range of assets and debts for which nominal debt Pareto-
dominates indexed debt.
There are two effects at play. First, because we compare economies with the same initial real liabilities, indexed debt
tends to give higher welfare than nominal debt. This is the case under full commitment as stated in Proposition 1, but
the effect is also present in Markov-perfect equilibria. The second effect, which could either compensate or reinforce
the first one, is the magnitude of the dynamic distortions induced by the time inconsistency.15
With σ = 1, Ramsey policy with indexed debt is time consistent, while it is time inconsistent with nominal debt. In
a Markov-perfect equilibrium, nominal debt is depleted to the point where debt is zero and policy is time consistent.
Such departure from stationarity is costly, and as a result indexed debt dominates nominal debt in terms of welfare,
when σ = 1.
If σ = 1, Ramsey policy is time inconsistent when debt is indexed, while when debt is nominal there is a level of
nominal debt (or assets) such that policy is time consistent. In particular, as we have seen, when σ < 1 and z < 0 (or
alternatively when σ > 1 and z > 0), the ‘intertemporal elasticity effect’ and the ‘nominal effect’ tend to mutually
offset; in fact both effects fully cancel out at the distorted steady state z¯ < 0 (alternatively, z¯ > 0). At the distorted
steady state z¯, the elimination of the time inconsistency distortions more than compensates for the potential dominance
of indexed debt. As a result, welfare is higher with nominal debt. This dominance of nominal debt is still present in
a range of initial debt (or asset) levels close to the distorted steady states. This follows from the fact that Markov-
equilibrium paths converge to the (nearby) distorted steady state, and therefore the cost of anticipated distortions—due
to ‘time inconsistencies’—is relatively small. In fact, the dominance of nominal debt can still be present at initial
values of debt for which the ‘intertemporal elasticity effect’ and the ‘nominal effect’ actually reinforce each other;
that is for relatively low debt values, z > 0, when σ < 1, or for relatively low asset values, z < 0, when σ > 1, as can
be seen Fig. 4.
As the intertemporal equilibrium condition (26) shows, the time-inconsistency ‘nominal effect’ is exacerbated by
the size of z (in absolute value); i.e. by the debt (or asset) to money ratio. Therefore, for large values of z (in absolute
value) the dynamic distortions due to time inconsistency are very costly. It follows that, for high levels of debt (or
assets) relative to money, indexed debt dominates nominal debt in terms of welfare.
When σ < 1, debt depletion is a characteristic of Markov-perfect equilibria with both indexed and nominal debt. If
the initial value of debt is high, the relative advantage of converging to z¯ < 0, as opposed to the first best, is properly
discounted into the distant future and offset by the more immediate cost of having the ‘nominal effect’ reinforcing
the ‘intertemporal elasticity effect’. Similarly, when σ > 1 and the initial level of debt is much higher than z¯ > 0, the
relative advantage of converging to z¯ > 0 is properly discounted and offset by the cost of depleting the debt, given
that the ‘intertemporal elasticity effect’ calls for postponing taxation and accumulating debt: a recommendation that
sequential optimal policy follows with indexed debt, but not with nominal debt. It should also be noticed that a similar
effect can happen when σ < 1 and −1 < z < z¯ < 0. Then the ‘intertemporal elasticity effect’ calls for anticipating
taxation and accumulating assets, while the ‘nominal effect’ calls for a relatively costly process of asset depletion; as
a result, in this case, welfare with indexed debt is higher when assets are high (see panel (b)).
To summarize we emphasize two points. The first is that we provide an interesting example of the principle that
adding a distortion to a second-best problem can actually improve welfare. Nominal debt adds a dynamic distortion to
the Markov-perfect equilibrium. In the case where policy is time consistent with indexed debt, adding this distortion
reduces welfare. When policy is time inconsistent with indexed debt, there are two dynamic distortions, due to the
differing elasticities and to nominal debt. In this case, adding the distortion from nominal debt can actually raise
welfare.
The second point has important policy implications. In the calibrated economy with σ different from one, when
debt is relatively high (relative to output) it is better to have indexed debt, but for moderate levels of debt, it is
preferable to have nominal debt, i.e. it is better to converge to the level of debt associated with the nominal-debt
distorted steady state (positive or negative), rather than have an indefinite accumulation of debt or its depletion and
subsequent accumulation of assets all the way to the first best.
6. Additional taxes
In most advanced economies, seigniorage is a minor source of revenue, and government liabilities are financed
mostly through consumption and income taxes. This raises the question of whether our previous analysis is still
valid when taxes are introduced so as to make seigniorage only a marginal component of government revenues. An
additional motivation to introduce taxes in our model is to inquire whether a fully committed fiscal authority can
overrun the commitment problems of a monetary authority. In this section we address these questions by introducing
both consumption and labor income taxes.
We show first that the introduction of taxes, when the fiscal authority sets taxes one period in advance, reduces
the need to raise revenues through seigniorage but does not change the characterization of equilibria with respect16
to the economies without taxes, analyzed in the previous sections. Our timing assumption is reasonable, taking into
account the different frequencies in which monetary and fiscal decisions are typically made and implemented. Second,
we show that, if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is not lower than one and there is full commitment on
the part of the fiscal authority (who makes policy choices before the monetary authority does), the fiscal authority
can implement the full-commitment Ramsey solution independently of the degree of commitment of the monetary
authority who is constrained to follow the Friedman rule of zero nominal interest rated. This result applies to both
economies with nominal and indexed-debt.
When the government levies consumption and labor income taxes, the household problem becomes:
max
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
u(ct ) − αnt
] (27)
subject to:
Pt
(
1 + τ ct
)
ct Mt (28)
and
Mt+1 + Bt+1 Mt − Pt
(
1 + τ ct
)
ct + Bt(1 + it ) + Pt
(
1 − τnt
)
nt , (29)
where τ ct , τ nt are consumption and labor income taxes, respectively, subject to the terminal condition: limT →∞ βT ×
BT +1
PT
 0.
Now, the marginal conditions (7), (8) and (9) characterizing the households’ optimal choice become:
uc(ct+1)
α
= (1 + it+1)
1 + τ ct+1
1 − τnt+1
, (30)
1 + it+1 = β−1
Pt+1(1 − τnt+1)
Pt (1 − τnt )
(31)
and
ct = Mt
Pt (1 + τ ct )
. (32)
These conditions must hold for every t  0. As in the economies without taxes, the cash-in-advance constraint (32)
is binding as long as uc(ct )/α > 1. However, in contrast with economies without taxes, uc(ct )/α > 1 does not imply
that the nominal interest rate is positive. The non-negativity of nominal interest rates is an additional restriction to the
implementation.
The sequence of government budget constraints in this economy is now given by
Ptg + Mgt + Bgt (1 + it ) Ptτ ct ct + Ptτnt nt + Mgt+1 + Bgt+1 (33)
while the feasibility conditions (1) do not change.
Define the effective labor income tax as:
τt = τ
c
t + τnt
1 + τ ct
, i.e. (1 − τt ) = 1 − τ
n
t
1 + τ ct
.
Then, using the equilibrium conditions (30)–(32), as well as the resource constraint (1), the intertemporal government
budget constraint can be written as the following implementability condition15
ct+1uc(ct+1)
β
α
+ βzt+1(1 − τt+1)−1ct+1 = ct + zt (1 − τt )−1ct + g, (34)
15 Notice that M
g
t
Pt (1−τnt ) = ct (1 − τt )
−1; M
g
t+1
Pt (1−τnt ) =
M
g
t+1
Pt+1(1−τnt+1)
Pt+1(1−τnt+1)
Pt (1−τnt ) = ct+1(1 − τt+1)
−1β(1 + it+1) = ct+1uc(ct+1) βα ;
B
g
t (1+it )
Pt (1−τn) =
B
g
t (1+it )
M
g
M
g
t
Pt (1−τn) = zt ct (1 − τt )
−1
, and
B
g
t+1
Pt (1−τn) =
B
g
t+1(1+it+1)
M
g
M
g
t+1
Pt (1−τn)(1+it+1) = βzt+1ct+1(1 − τt+1)
−1
.t t t t t+1 t
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together with the terminal condition
lim
T →∞β
T cT +1uc(cT +1)
β
α
+ βzT +1(1 − τT +1)−1cT +1) = 0.
These implementability conditions compare with (11). The equations are the same, except that the variable zt
in (11) is the variable zt (1 − τt )−1 in (34).
6.1. Optimal monetary policy when the fiscal authority moves one period in advance
We now consider the case where tax decisions for some period t must be made one period in advance, and may
depend only on the state at t − 1. In this case we can define the new state variable zˆt ≡ zt (1 − τt )−1, and the problems
are isomorphic to the problems in the previous sections, since the implementability condition (34) reduces to
ct+1uc(ct+1)
β
α
+ βzˆt+1ct+1 = ct + zˆt ct + g, (35)
which is formally identical to (11).
Notice that financing liabilities through taxes reduces the need to use seigniorage, however this does not mean that
distortions are reduced, since uc(ct+1)/α = (1 + it+1)(1 − τt+1)−1.
Consistent with our framework, we assume that the fiscal authority either sets a sequence of taxes {τt }∞t=0—and
commits to it—or defines a recursive strategy for taxes—from period one on—as a function of the state; i.e. sets τ0
and τt+1 = τ(zt ). As long as the nominal interest rates are away from the lower bound of zero nominal interest rates,
the problem for the monetary authority has the same structure as before, and therefore the same results obtain.
In summary, the monetary authority faces the same problem with predetermined taxes on consumption and in-
come as with only seigniorage, for any degree of monetary commitment. The recursive strategies of the monetary
authority C(zˆ) and z′(zˆ)are the same as in the economy without taxes, as long as nominal interest rates are positive.
6.1.1. Additional taxes with indexed debt
In the economy with indexed debt let
bˆt = bt
(
1 − τnt
)−1 = Bt(1 + it )
Pt (1 − τnt )
.
That is, bˆt = zt ct (1 − τt )−1 = zˆt ct . Then the implementability condition with indexed debt can be written as
ct+1uc(ct+1)
β
α
+ βbˆt+1 = ct + bˆt ct + g. (36)
With labor taxes set one period in advance, as long as nominal interest rates are positive, the policy choices C(bˆ) and
b′(bˆ) are the same as in the economy without taxes. Furthermore, if τnt = 0 then the implementability condition is
equivalent to (14) with bˆt = bt . This means that when there are only consumption taxes, whether these are decided
one period in advance or not, the policy problem and therefore the optimal path of indexed debt do not change.
6.2. When the fiscal authority can fully commit
Whenever the discretionary incentive is to have higher current tax (which is the case with σ  1), it is possible to
set taxes in a way that the resulting monetary policy follows the full-commitment Ramsey solution with zero nominal
interest rates.16
Full-commitment solutions, both with indexed and nominal debt, have the characteristic that consumption is con-
stant from period one on. Let c0, ct = c¯, t  1, be the optimal path of consumption with full-commitment in a given
economy. Let taxes be τt = τ , t  1, where
uc(c¯)
α
= (1 + τ¯ )−1.
16 The Friedman rule is optimal in an economy with cash and credit goods if preferences are separable in leisure and homothetic in the two
consumption goods.18
In period zero, the monetary authority has no incentive to deviate from such consumption plan. Consider the choice
of the monetary authority at any t  1. If the incentive is to delay consumption then, given that the government
present value budget constraint must be satisfied, there must be some future consumption ct+1+s , s  0, such that
ct < c < ct+1+s , as long as raising the tax rates raises revenue. However, since uc(ct+1+s)/α = (1 + it+1+s)(1 + τ¯ )−1
it must be that it+1+s < 0. Negative interest rates cannot be an equilibrium in this economy since households would
borrow without limit.
It follows that there is no gain in partially monetizing the stock of nominal debt in any period, and monetary policy
can only passively implement the full-commitment solution of the corresponding nominal or indexed-debt economy.17
Proposition 3. In an economy with either nominal or indexed debt (with zˆ0 or bˆ0), assume fiscal authorities maximize
the welfare of the representative household and fully commit to their policies. If σ  1 then the fiscal authorities
can induce the implementation of the corresponding full-commitment Ramsey equilibrium regardless of the degree of
commitment of the monetary authority.
As we have seen, when σ > 1 the monetary authority has an incentive to reduce the current price level (i.e. the
‘intertemporal elasticity’ effect may dominate the ‘nominal debt’ effect) and so in this case the previous argument
cannot be applied.
7. Concluding remarks
This paper has discussed the different ways in which nominal and indexed debt affect the sequential choice of
optimal monetary and debt policies. To this purpose, we have studied a general equilibrium monetary model where
the costs of unanticipated inflation arise from a cash-in-advance constraint with the timing of Svensson (1985), and
where government expenditures are exogenous.
In our environment, as in Nicolini (1998), when the utility function is logarithmic in consumption and linear in
leisure and debt is indexed, there is no time-inconsistency problem. In this case, the optimal monetary policy is to
maintain the initial level of indexed debt, independently of the level of commitment of a benevolent government.
In contrast, for the same specification of preferences, when the initial stock of government debt is nominal, a time-
inconsistency problem arises. In this case, the government is tempted to inflate away its nominal debt liabilities. When
the government cannot commit to its planned policies, to progressively deplete the outstanding stock is part of an
optimal sequential policy. Optimal nominal interest rates in this case are also decreasing and converge asymptotically.
In the rational expectations equilibria of our economies there are no surprise inflations. Still, for a given initial real
value of outstanding debt, the sequential optimal equilibrium with indexed debt provides higher welfare. In this sense
nominal debt can be a burden on optimal monetary policy.
When we consider CRRA preferences with the intertemporal elasticity of substitution different from one, it is still
true that in a Markov-perfect equilibrium the path of nominal debt converges to a stationary level of debt. However,
it is not zero, but negative or positive depending on the intertemporal elasticity being greater or lower than one. With
such general preferences, optimal sequential policy is time inconsistent even when debt is indexed. The interaction of
the two sources of dynamic distortions, resulting from the differing elasticities and from nominal debt, can overturn
the above efficiency result and it may actually be the case that nominal debt provides higher welfare than indexed
debt. In fact, our computations show that, for relatively low values of debt, welfare is higher when debt is nominal.
This is one more illustration of the principle that in a second best, adding a distortion may actually increase welfare.
However, our computations also show that, for large levels of debt, indexed debt dominates in terms of welfare and
therefore nominal debt is a burden to monetary policy.
The introduction of additional forms of taxation further clarifies the interplay between the various forms of debt and
commitment possibilities. Under the natural assumption that fiscal policy choices are predetermined, we have shown
that the optimal policy problem has the same characterization, provided that the revenues levied through seigniorage
are enough to allow for an optimal monetary policy with non-negative interest rates.
If there is full commitment to an optimal fiscal policy, the fiscal authorities, anticipating monetary policy distor-
tions, may choose to fully finance government liabilities and—provided the elasticity of substitution is greater or equal
17 Marimon et al. (2003) make a similar argument in a different context.19
to one—the resulting monetary policy follows the Friedman rule of zero nominal interest rates. Moreover, this policy
results in the equilibrium that obtains in the economy with full commitment with indexed debt, even if debt is nominal
and the monetary authority cannot commit.
Ours is a normative (second-best) analysis that takes into account the commitment problems which are at the
root of institutional design in many developed economies (such as Central Bank independence, constraints on public
indebtedness, etc.). As such, it throws new light on the ways in which the possibility of monetizing nominal debts can
affect monetary policy (a central concern in policy design), and on how optimal debt and monetary policies should
be designed. We do not claim that our results on optimal-equilibrium debt paths match—or should match—observed
data. Still, it is the case that the prescriptions of our model could be used to provide a more detailed positive analysis
of existing monetary policies and some insights on how monetary and debt policies should be redesigned if necessary.
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Appendix A. Equilibria with first-best outcomes
In this appendix we discuss in more detail equilibria with first-best outcomes; in particular, equilibria where the
cash-in-advance constraints may not be binding. To understand these cases it is enough to consider optimal poli-
cies with full commitment. In these economies, the implementability constraint, assuming that the cash-in-advance
constraint holds with equality and given that optimal consumption is constant from period t = 1 on, reduces to
β
[
uc(c1)
α
− 1 c1 − (1 − β)c0 − g = (1 − β)x0
where x0 = b0 if debt is indexed, and x0 = z0c0 if debt is nominal.
Clearly, if initial government assets are large enough for there to be no need to raise distortionary taxes, the first
best is achieved, i.e. c1 = c0 = c∗, where uc(c∗)α = 1.
Both in economies with nominal and indexed debt, there is a first-best solution where the cash-in-advance constraint
holds with equality in every period, even if it is not binding. In the indexed-debt economy that will be the case if initial
debt is b0 = b∗ ≡ −c∗ − g(1−β) , and in the nominal debt economy, if initial debt is z0 ≡ z∗ = −1 − g(1−β)c∗ , which
results in real initial assets b∗ = z∗c∗. When initial assets are larger (b0 < b∗ or z0 < z∗), the government transfers to
the consumers the redundant assets lump sum in order to implement the first-best allocation.
With nominal debt, it is possible to implement the first-best allocations for any z0 < −1, i.e. Mg0 +Bg0 (1 + i0) < 0,
although then the cash-in-advance constraints do not hold with equality and therefore the implementability conditions
cannot be written as above. By imposing the transversality condition (10), the budget constraint of the government
(12) can then be written as
∞∑
t=0
βt+1
it+1Mgt+1
Pt+1
= M
g
0 + Bg0 (1 + i0)
P0
+ g
1 − β .
But if Mg0 + Bg0 (1 + i0) < 0, there is a price P0, such that the first-best ct = c∗, for all t  0, is achieved. At the
first-best, it+1 = 0, t  0, and therefore
M
g
0
P0
(1 + z0) = − g1 − β .
If z0 ∈ (z∗,−1) then M
g
0
P0
> c∗, i.e. the cash-in-advance constraint is not satisfied with equality. In particular, if
1 + z0 = −ε < 0, with ε → 0, in order to achieve the first-best, M
g
0 → ∞ (which means that initial real debt isP0
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g
0 (1+i0)
P0
= −M
g
0
P0
− g1−β → −∞). But this solution with total assets that are positive but arbitrarily low is not an
equilibrium if anticipated. Indeed from the Fisher equation (8), the nominal interest rate would have to be negative
and approaching −1, as the price level approaches zero. Private agents would be able to make infinite profits by
borrowing at the negative nominal rate and holding money. As a result, when z0 < −1, but close to −1, there is a first-
best full commitment Ramsey equilibrium, but there is no Markov-perfect equilibrium for z < −1 and close to −1,
since the latter imposes that the government policy be anticipated, and the above incentive to deflate is equally present
when there is no commitment.
Finally, the case z0 = −1 also deserves to be discussed. The corresponding full-commitment Ramsey equilibrium
results in a time-inconsistent optimal policy given by c0 = c∗ and c1 being the solution to β[uc(c1)α − 1]c1 = g, while
zt = −1, for t  1. A Markov-perfect equilibrium with z0 = −1 must have c0 = c∗ but z1 > −1, since it is not possible
to have z1 −1.
Appendix B. Numerical exercises
We carry out numerical exercises for three different values of the elasticity of substitution: σ1 = 0.6, σ2 = 1.0, and
σ3 = 1.4. To solve our model economies we must choose numerical values for α, β , and g. These are the same for
the different economies. We assume that the value of β is such that the real interest rate is approximately two percent.
Consequently, β = 0.98.
We take as reference values a constant government expenditure to output ratio of g/y = 0.01 and a constant debt
to output ratio of b/y = 0.8. The reason for the low expenditure to output ratio is that these are the expenditures to be
financed with seigniorage which is a relatively low share of tax revenues. Since in our model economies g + c = y,
these choices imply that g/c = 0.01 and b/c = 0.81. Next, we normalize units so that c = 1 and, therefore g =
0.01 and y = 1.01. To obtain the value of α we use the implementability condition (14) with stationary values of
consumption and debt:
c−σ
α
= 1
β
[
1 + g
c
+ (1 − β)b
c
. (B.1)
Notice that, given our normalization c = 1, different values of σ result in the same choice of α; which, given the rest
of the parameters, is α = 0.95.
These choices imply that the values of b that support the first best in the economies with indexed debt are b∗1 =−1.59, b∗2 = −1.55, b∗3 = −1.54. These are obtained by computing c∗i such that (c∗i )−σi /α = 1, and the corresponding
value of b∗i satisfies (B.1). The choices of parameters also imply that the distorted steady-state values of z for the
economies with nominal debt are z¯1 = −0.429 (corresponding to c¯1 = 1.05 and b¯1 = −0.451), z¯2 = 0 (corresponding
to c¯2 = 1.02 and b¯2 = 0), and z¯3 = 0.419 (corresponding to c¯3 = 1.01 and b¯3 = 0.423). These are obtained using (20)
for stationary consumption and the implementability condition (11) in the steady state, so that
z¯ = −uc(c¯)
α
(1 − σ)
and
c¯uc(c¯)
α
[
1 − (1 − β)σ ]= c¯ + g.
Therefore, since (1 − β)σ < 1, there is a solution for c¯ and, correspondingly, for z¯.
B.1. Algorithm
Let u(c) = (c1−σ − 1)/(1 − σ). Then to compute the monetary equilibria numerically, we solve the following
dynamic program:
V (x) = max{u(c) − α(c + g) + βV (x ′) (B.2)
subject to
β
C(b′)1−σ + βb′ = c + g + b (B.3)α
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when x = b and the debt is indexed, or subject to
β
α
C(z′)1−σ + βz′C(z′) = (1 + z)c + g (B.4)
when x = z and the debt is nominal.
The Bellman operators associated with these problems are:
Vn+1(x) = T
[
Vn(x)
]= max{u(c) − α(c + g) + βVn(x′) (B.5)
subject to expression (B.3) when x = b and the debt is indexed, or subject to expression (B.4) when x = z and the
debt is nominal.
To solve these problems, we use the following algorithm:
• Step 1: Choose numerical values for parameters α, β , σ , and g.
• Step 2: Define a discrete grid on x (with the first-best level of debt as a lower bound for the grid with indexed
debt, −1 as a lower bound for the grid with nominal debt as well as for the grid of welfare comparisons, and a
large upper bound, so as to capture an unambiguous welfare ranking across regimes for high values of debt. This
may require a robustness test on the upper bound; see below how we treat the case σ > 1).
• Step 3: Define a decreasing discrete function Cn(x).
• Step 4: Define an initial discrete function Vn(x) and iterate on the Bellman operator defined above until we find
the converged V ∗(x), x′∗(x), C∗(x).
• Step 5: If C∗(x) = Cn(x), we are done. Otherwise, update Cn(x) and go to Step 3.
The above algorithm must be modified to compute indexed economies with σ > 1 where the level of debt grows
(at a rate lower than β−1). In this case we iterate the above procedure by expanding the upper bound (in Step 2) until
successive iterations do not (significantly) change optimal policies in the relevant range.
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